Abstract. We examine a logic that combines knowledge, awareness, and change of awareness. Change of awareness involves that an agent becomes aware of propositional variables. We show that the logic is decidable, and we present a complete axiomatization.
Introduction
Awareness and knowledge. Modal logic has long been used to reason about knowledge and belief in multi-agent systems. In modal logics we model uncertainty by allowing the value of propositions to vary between the so-called possible worlds. An agent knows a proposition in a given world if the proposition is true in all worlds accessible from that world. The logics require that the agents are aware of all propositional variables in the model. Thus reasoning in these models is undertaken under a closed world assumption: the relevant propositional variables are known to all agents. For every propositional variable in every world, every agent assigns a value to that variable.
While agents may be uncertain about the value of propositions, they may also be unaware of these propositions, and they may become aware of propositions. Uncertainty and incompleteness (i.e., unawareness) are different issues in modelling multi-agent systems. Without taking awareness into account, it seems difficult to explain the following transition, wherein the epistemic complexity of the model increases: Hans van Ditmarsch is also affiliated to the Institute of Mathematical Sciences Chennai as a research associate.
Initially, Hans (i) does not know whether coffee is served (p) after his talk. (Actually, no coffee will be served-¬p, underlined.) Hans is unaware of it that wine is not served (¬q) after his talk. Now, someone mentions that wine and coffee will not both be served. This makes Hans aware that wine is an issue. After this, Hans does not know whether coffee is served after his talk and also does not know whether wine is served after his talk. (Of course, actually, there is no coffee and no wine.)
We find that there are many subtleties and intricacies involved in defining the semantics for such dynamics of awareness. In this paper we will discuss these intricacies and in doing so make the following contributions:
1. We will introduce a new form of model equivalence modulo the agents' awareness and uncertainty, called awareness bisimulation. 2. We will define a new type of knowledge, referred to as intrinsic knowledge.
Intrinsic knowledge is essential to express the dynamic interactions between awareness and knowledge. It relates to implicit and explicit knowledge. 3. We will introduce an logical operator for becoming aware of propositional variables and give semantics for this operator that is consistent with our intuitions of awareness and knowledge.
Prior research. Our work is rooted in: the tradition of epistemic logic [10] and in particular multi-agent epistemic logic [13, 2] ; in various research since the 1980s on the interaction of awareness and knowledge [1, 14, 15, 8] -including a relation to recent works like [9, 5, 7] ; and in modal logical research in propositional quantification, starting in the 1970s with [3] and followed up by work on bisimulation quantifiers [18, 11, 4] . Works treating awareness either follow a more semantically flavoured approach, where awareness concerns propositional variables in the valuation [1, 15, 8] , or a more syntactically flavoured approach. In the latter, awareness concerns all formulas of the language in a given set, in order to model 'limited rationality' of agents. It is (also) pursued in [1] and in recent work like [5] . We are straight into the semantic corner: within the limits of their awareness, agents are fully rational.
For the static part of the logical language we follow [1] . For the dynamic part, it is remarkable that levels of 'interactive unawareness' in [8] can be described in terms of the awareness bisimulation introduced in our work (at the end of our paper). The insights made clear in their paper were very motivating for us. Our work builds on [17] , which focusses on a special case (public global awareness) of the current paper, but unlike the present paper also treats awareness of other agents and forgetting (i.e., becoming unaware).
Structures
Given are a countably infinite set of propositional variables (facts) P and a (disjoint) finite set of agents N . Propositional variables are named p, q, r, and agent variables are named i, j, k, possibly indexed or quoted.
Definition 1 (Epistemic awareness model). An epistemic awareness model
for N and P is a tuple M = (S, R, A, V ) that consists of a domain S of (factual) states (or 'worlds'), an accessibility function R : N → P(S × S), an awareness function A : N → S → P(P ∪ N ) and a valuation function V : P → P(S). For R(i) we write R i and for A(i) we write A i ; accessibility function R can be seen as a set of accessibility relations R i , and V as a set of valuations V (p). A pointed epistemic awareness model (M, s) is an epistemic awareness state.
Given an arbitrary model M we will refer to the elements of the tuple as
The awareness function A may be varied to reflect different logics. Public global awareness results if the value of A is the same for all agents and for all states. Individual global awareness results if the awareness function is the same in all states, but may vary among agents. These logics are discussed in [17] . In this work we focus on the logic of individual local awareness where there are no constraints placed on the awareness function A. For the sake of generality we will assume no restrictions on the accessibility function R i , either. However, we will sometimes require that the relation satisfies some simple properties (such as reflexivity, transitivity, etc.). The property of awareness introspection [8] holds if all agents know when they are aware of a fact or of another agent:
Awareness bisimulation. Consider the following scenario: in state s agent i is aware of proposition p, state u is accessible for agent i from state s, and in state u agent j is aware of proposition p and also of proposition q. That agent j is also aware of q in u should leave agent i indifferent, as she is not aware of q in s! This sort of similarity is captured in the following notion, named awareness bisimulation. Informally, given a model and a set of propositional variables P ⊆ P , another model is a P awareness bisimulation if it cannot be distinguished from the first by formulas consisting only of the propositional variables in P , in the scope of agents who are aware of those propositions.
Definition 2 (Awareness bisimulation). Let epistemic awareness models
The 'aware' clause can be considered as an additional basic structural requirement besides 'atoms', only due to the nature of our models where states have more structure than merely factual truth. If we were to replace R[P ∩ A i (s)] in the back and forth clauses with R[P ], we would have the definition of a standard (restricted) bisimulation over labelled transition structures [16] . (Restricted to P ⊆ P .) Thus every bisimulation is an awareness bisimulation. Vice versa, if all agents are aware of all propositional variables, the awareness bisimulation is a standard bisimulation (for the relations R i ). This is what we desire: we then revert to the standard multi-agent epistemic situation, where awareness plays no role.
Proposition 1.
The relation ↔ P is an equivalence relation.
Proof. This can be easily seen by examining the Definition 2.
Definition 2 is more complex than the definition of standard bisimulation, however its motivation is very simple. Two worlds are P -awareness bisimilar if, for any observer aware only of the propositions in P , the worlds appear identical. It gives us the "P -perspective" of a world. We also call it observational equivalence. Let that observer be agent i in state s, then the required P is A i (s) and her perspective is that of A i (s)-awareness-bisimilarity. We might also say that her view of the model is that of its R[A i (s)] equivalence class. The crucial part of the definition is that in 'forth', in the requirement "(t, t ) ∈ R[P ∩ A i (s)]", the bisimulation for state t is (further) restricted to the propositional variables that agent i is aware of in state s, the i-predecessor of t. (And similarly for 'back'.) An honoured principle (also in economics, and in artificial intelligence) is that incompleteness precedes uncertainty. The awareness function of an agent in a given state (incompleteness) determines what the agent can 'see' in all accessible states (uncertainty), and so on. This chaining of awareness is expressed with awareness bisimulation. This chaining requirement was present in epistemic awareness structures since its inception in [1] . We have merely employed it to the full and in the one and only way, for structural similarity.
Example. In Figure 1 agent i is aware of p but unaware of q in state s. In the figure, names of states are followed, separated by a dot, by values of propositional variables. Unaware variables are between parentheses. For example, s.p(¬q) means that in state s p is true and q is false, and the agent is aware of p and not of q. The three depicted epistemic states, wherein she (from left to right) implicitly knows q, knows ¬q, or does not know whether q, are observationally indistinguishable for the agent: they are p-awareness bisimilar. A p-awareness bisimulation between (e.g.) the left and the right picture is R = {(s, s ), (t, t ), (t, t )}. 
Language and Semantics
We augment multi-agent epistemic logic with three new operators: A i ϕ, to mean that agent i is aware of all the propositional variables in ϕ; and A + i pϕ for agent i becoming aware of propositional variable p, after which ϕ is true. The construct K i ϕ, "agent i knows ϕ" stands in our case for "agent i intrinsically knows ϕ"-the meaning of intrinsic will be explained later.
Definition 3 (Language). Given are a countably infinite set of propositional variables (facts/atoms) P , and a (disjoint) countably infinite set of agents N . The language L of individual local awareness is defined as
where i ∈ N and p ∈ P . Implication →, disjunction ∨, and equivalence ↔ are defined by abbreviation. For ¬K i ¬ϕ we write L i ϕ.
The semantics of the awareness operator A i is purely syntax-based, namely using the free variables of a formula. These are defined as:
We explicitly include in the language, as the usual abbreviation p∨¬p complicates cases where not all agents are aware of p (an agent unaware of p would then not explicitly know truth).
Definition 4 (Semantics). Let
where
V ). The set of validities (and the logic) is called DLILA (Dynamic Logic of Individual Local Awareness).
Intrinsic knowledge. The treatment of knowledge in this semantics is novel. An agent knows ϕ only if in all accessible states ϕ remains true for every possible interpretation of all propositional variables that she is unaware of. We achieve this by composing the accessibility relation for an agent with the bisimulation relation modulo the propositional variables of which the agent is unaware. Because the constraints in this composition are interdependent, we have one K i operator in the logical language and not, instead, two independent operators, one for standard modal accessibility and another one for bisimulation quantification. If the agent is aware of every propositional variable in the formula ϕ, the interpretation of knowledge is as for epistemic logic.
Awareness dynamics. Compared to knowledge, the semantics of becoming aware is simple. The complexity of becoming aware can only be seen in the context of intrinsic knowledge. Suppose that the agent is unaware of p and that p is true in all accessible states. We then have that A + i pK i p is true: after the agent becomes aware of p, p is true. But although the agent considers that as a possibility, she does not know that, and she also considers it possible that after becoming aware of p, she knows that p is false, or that she is uncertain about p: all true are
In this paper, we made one of three possible choices for awareness dynamics. All three consist of making an unaware variable into an aware variable, i.e., changing the set A in a model but leaving all other parameters the same. Given state s, one can make agent i aware of the propositional variable p:
-in the actual state and all states accessible for agent i:
All three are bisimulation invariant (with for the 'actual state only' version the restriction that the operation is performed on a bisimulation contraction, this requires a further adjustment of the definition). You might see the public version of becoming aware as the 'public announcement' version of awareness dynamics: just as in information dynamics, more complex dynamics have more complex axiomatizations, and this is on our future agenda.
KD45 and S5
Apart from the logic DLILA we also consider the logics DLILA L , where every modal operator K i satisfies the axioms of the logic L. Typical choices of L are S5 and KD45. One should be careful to note that this is not a simple case of restriction. Restricting the underlying logic to L (for example KD45) means that in interpreting the formula K i ϕ, we may only consider pointed models (M , t ) that satisfy the constraints of L (so transitive, serial and euclidean for KD45). The validities of DLILA L therefore do not necessarily extend those of DLILA. And indeed, each axiomatization also poses new problems.
Specific logics require us to vary the semantics of the operator A + i p. For example, given awareness introspection and S5, the minimal way of becoming aware makes an agent aware of a propositional variable in the current world and in every indistinguishable world (the second option, before). In this paper we show completeness for the logic DLILA K namely for awareness models M where (S M , R M ) is a tree, and where becoming aware means becoming aware in every world.
Where to put the complexity? An alternative interaction between knowledge and becoming aware is embodied in the following semantics (presented in [17] ):
Here, the epistemic operator K i remains the 'classical' one, whereas the becoming aware operator A + i p is the complex one. The advantage is obvious: the novel operator is the only addition to a well-known logic (namely that of [1] ). The disadvantage is that a propositional variable may change its value in the process of the agent becoming aware of it; p may be true, but in the transition to a (P \ {p})-bisimilar state it may become false. So, e.g., the agent may become aware that she knows p to be false, even if prior to that she 'implicitly knew' p to be true. In that semantics, K i does not mean implicit knowledge at all.
It seemed better to stock all the factual change into the mind of the agent only, as in the complex K i operator, such that the becoming aware operation is merely revealing the veil of incompleteness. For KD45 and S5 structures that also satisfy 'awareness introspection' the distinction is immaterial, as the two semantics then are identical with respect to explicit knowledge. So, from an agent's point of view, there is no difference. Consider a KD45 extension of these models, i.e., add access (t, t) on the left, (t , t ) in the middle, and (t , t ), (t , t ), (t , t ), (t , t ) on the right. Now we have that the agent considers it possible that: after becoming aware of q, she knows that q, or she knows that ¬q, or she does not know whether q. 3. Consider the case of DLILA KD45 , where every agent's accessibility relation is transitive, serial and euclidean. Crucially, in KD45, strong beliefs may be mistaken, but you do not consider that possible: to yourself, your beliefs appear knowledge. So L i (¬p∧K i p) is inconsistent. However, in DLILA KD45 it is valid that an agent i considers it possible that she becomes aware of a propositional variable p that is false and that she believes to be true. That is nothing but speculating about becoming aware of false information that you had reason to accept! A validity of the language is
The interpretation of this formula is shown in Figure 2 . The crucial aspect is that the pair (s, t) ∈ R[∅] (the dashed line): agent i cannot a priori distinguish the reality of p being true in the believed world from the speculative option that p is false there but believed true. However, after becoming aware of p (in both s and t) this option is out of reach, as (s, t) ∈ R[p]. 
Intrinsic, Explicit and Implicit Knowledge
Past literature on knowledge and awareness has focused on the difference between implicit knowledge ("knowing" something without being fully aware of that thing) and explicit knowledge ("knowing" something as well as being fully aware of that thing). Intrinsic knowledge is strictly weaker than explicit knowledge and strictly stronger than implicit knowledge. It allows us to reason about the process of becoming aware, and that is our reason to complicate the existing picture. Implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge are definable in our framework, and we can compare those definitions with the traditional definitions.
Definition 5 (Explicit knowledge K E i and implicit knowledge K
means 'becoming aware of a finite set of propositional variables' and is defined in the obvious way. We also have that [12] ). Intrinsic knowledge is clearly not definable in terms of implicit and explicit knowledge, given its semantics employing bisimulation quantification! Interaction between the three kinds of knowledge includes:
On the other hand, |= K I i ϕ → K i ϕ. For example, you can implicitly know that p but, as you are unaware of p, you do not intrinsically know that p.
Proposition 4. Awareness bisimilar states satisfy the same explicit knowledge:
Proof. Note that A i ϕ means v (ϕ) ⊆ A i (s). In the language restricted to A i (s) the epistemic awareness states (M, s) and (M , s ) are therefore bisimilar in the standard sense, from which follows logical equivalence, thus equivalence of A i ϕ ∧ K i ϕ in both states.
Decidability
In this section we show decidability via an embedding into bisimulation-quantified modal logics [4] . Bisimulation-quantified modal logic is an extension of multimodal (such as multi-agent) modal logic with the bisimulation quantifier, ∃pϕ, which is interpreted as: "there is some model bisimilar to the current model except for the atom p, and in which ϕ is true". We recall the notion of restricted bisimulation already apparent in Definition 2. These logics are interpreted on models without the awareness function but that are otherwise similar.
Definition 6 (Bisimulation Quantified Modal Logic)
. Let L C be the set of validities for a model class C. We define the bisimulation-quantified extension of L C to be QL C with the syntax:
where p ∈ P and i ∈ N , and with the crucial semantic clause:
It is shown in [4] that bisimulation quantified logics are decidable where L C is an idempotent transduction logic; multi-agent S5 and multi-agent K describe such idempotent transduction logics, and consequently have decidable bisimulation quantified extensions. We will give the embedding for DLILA K in QL K (where K is the class of models satisfying all K validities). 
Definition 7. Let ϕ ∈ L, and for every agent i ∈ N and for every propositional variable (atom)
The equivalences here are all straightforward, except for the one labelled * . In the forward direction this is trivial: every C ϕ -bisimulation is a C-awareness bisimulation. In the reverse direction, we must note the construction of α| ϕ . Here
With respect to this form we can see that C ϕ -bisimulations and C-awareness-bisimulations indeed are equivalent since every application of a modality extends the bisimulation according to awareness function at that point. Since C is defined to be the set of atoms of which agent i is aware, the result follows. Finally, we note that for the interpretation of A + i pα it is enough to manually fix the interpretation of every free occurrence of the atom a p i in α| ϕ to true, as A i p will be true in every state.
Thus we have a translation from DLILA K to the bisimulation quantified logic QL K that preserves the meaning of formulas (given a set of awareness atoms in the model). Decidable satisfiability and model-checking follow. We have not yet investigated the lower bound for complexity of the translation. The translation given is quite general, as it also suffices for QL KD45 or QL S5 .
Axiomatization
We provide an axiomatization DLILA for DLILA K , and we show it to be sound and complete. The propositional rules and axioms, and those for knowledge (only involving K i ), are standard. The axioms for awareness (for A i ) simply capture the syntactic definition. The interaction between knowledge and awareness is governed by the axioms AK1-AK4.
C0 All tautologies of prop. logic K
In AK1 we require that ψ is free for p in ϕ, and the axioms AK3 and AK4 may only be applied in the case where the atom p does not appear outside the scope of a modal (knowledge) operator. Axioms AK1 and AK2 are not required in the completeness proof, but we have left them in as they represent important principles that hold in all semantic variations of DLILA: AK1 shows that if an agent is not aware of an atom, then the agent may not distinguish the interpretation of that atom from the interpretation of an arbitrary proposition; AK2 states that if intrinsic knowledge of ψ can be derived from explicit knowledge of ϕ, then intrinsic knowledge of ψ may also be derived from intrinsic knowledge of ϕ and awareness of ψ. Axioms AK3 and AK4 are specific to the K semantics: they capture the intrinsic nature of the knowledge operator: if an agent is unaware of an atom, he does not refute any interpretation of that atom, nor does he refute the interpretation of any agent's awareness of that atom. Finally we present axioms for becoming aware. We note from the semantics that if an agent i becomes aware of an atom this will only affect the interpretation for formulas A i ϕ or K i ϕ. Consequently A + i p commutes with all other operators.
Soundness and completeness. The soundness is straightforward. We show completeness for DLILA by constructing a canonical model for any formula using maximal consistent sets of formulas in L-proofs are in the appendix. 
we have p ∈ A i (σ) if and only if
A i p ∈ σ; -for all σ ∈ S, for all p ∈ P , we have σ ∈ V(p) if and only if p ∈ σ.
Proposition 6. Every canonical model is an epistemic awareness model.
Proof. In the presence of complete awareness, intrinsic knowledge is equivalent to explicit knowledge, and the logic of explicit knowledge is canonical. We note that the awareness function A is constant for each agent's local state because of the axiom AK3.
Lemma 1 (Truth Lemma).
For every σ ∈ S, for every formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∈ σ if and only if M, σ |= ϕ.
(Proof in Appendix.) It follows that for every consistent formula ϕ we may construct a model so the axiomatization DLILA is complete for the logic DLILA.
Comparison
Our approach is in some respects simpler and more constrained than [8] . From the epistemic awareness structure we are able to implicitly derive a complete lattice of spaces via awareness bisimulation, whereas in [8] this structure is given explicitly. In other words, we have a succinct, technical tool to derive that result.
The principles A1, . . . , A6 in DLILA straightforwardly correspond to (a multiagent version of) L KXA in [6] and Proposition 3 in [8]-epistemic operators K i in the scope of awareness operators can be replaced by the explicit knowledge operators K E i assumed by those authors; A5 is a 'mix' axiom relating to dynamics. Principles AK1 and AK2 were conceived using results for bisimulationquantified logics and are strictly about intrinsic knowledge only.
Although we do not explicitly have propositional quantifiers, they are indirectly present in intrinsic knowledge operators. Propositional quantification is integrated with awareness and knowledge in [7] (and in various precursors). This concerns quantification over the set of formulas of which an agent is aware. They interestingly mention that "Using semantic valuations [for quantification] does not work in the presence of awareness" [7, p.506] ; although of course correct, we are wondering if our work may make the authors reconsider the suggested scope of that remark.
Dynamics of (factual) awareness is presented in [9, 5, 19] . In [9] becoming aware means (initially) becoming ignorant about that proposition. It uses an algebraic approach. Becoming ignorant is also the approach in the recent [19] , that contains various other novelties. In [5] , the approach in Section 3 is similarly dynamic modal as ours, and it provides an integrated combination of syntactic and semantic awareness.
by application of the axioms A1-A6 we have A i ϕ ∈ σ iff for all atoms p in ϕ we have A i p ∈ τ . By the aware clause of Definition 2, this is equivalent to A i p ∈ τ so we must have A i ϕ ∈ τ . Finally, if K i ϕ ∧ A i ϕ ∈ σ, then for all σ ∈ σR i we have ϕ ∈ σ . By Definition 2 for all τ ∈ τ R i , there exists σ ∈ σR i such that τ ↔ C∩Ai(σ) σ . By the induction hypothesis it follows that ϕ ∈ τ , so
(⇐=) Here we show that the relations B(C) satisfy the properties specified in Definition 2. Clearly the clauses atom and aware hold since if (σ, τ ) ∈ B(C) then σ and τ agree on all C-explicit formulas which includes the atoms in C, and the awareness of those atoms. To see forth holds, suppose that (σ, τ ) ∈ B(C). Then for all agents i, for all σ
By the axiom B4a every finite subset of the C ∩ A i (σ)-explicit formulas in σ is consistent with the set of implicit knowledge
As there is no finite proof of inconsistency we may conclude that the set of C ∩ A i (σ)-explicit formulas in σ is consistent with the set of implicit knowledge formulas in τ . By Definition 8 there is some τ ∈ τ R i such that (σ, τ ) ∈ B(C ∩ A i (σ), as required. The case for back is handled symmetrically.
Lemma 2 provides a compelling justification for the notion of awareness bisimulation. Two states are C-awareness bisimilar exactly when they agree on all C-explicit formulas. We continue with the proof of the Truth Lemma 1 proper.
Proof (Sketch)
. This lemma is given by induction over the complexity of formulas. The base case, where ϕ ∈ P or ϕ = is a direct application of the definition of V, so we may assume for all ψ ⊂ ϕ, for all σ ∈ S we have ψ ∈ σ if and only if M, σ |= ψ. The induction proceeds as follows: 
(since the conjunction γ of every finite subset appears in σ as L i γ), and furthermore, it must be consistent with the A i (σ)-explicit formulas that appear in some τ ∈ σR i . Therefore, we may find a maximal consistent set
We proceed by induction over the knowledge-depth of ψ, where the induction hypothesis is, that for all ψ of knowledge depth n: ) ∈ σ. Applying the inductive hypothesis we have L i ψ ∈ σ as required.
For the base case, iff ψ has knowledge depth 0, we can see from axioms B0-B7 and A1-A6 that ψ is effectively a propositional formula where the atoms are either propositional atoms, or agents' awareness of propositional atoms. Now there are two cases: if A i ψ ∈ σ, then by the axiom B4b we have for every τ ∈ σR i , for every τ ↔ Ai(σ) τ , ψ ∈ τ , so (M, σ) |= K i ψ and we are done. Alternatively, if A i ψ / ∈ σ, then there are some atoms in ψ that agent i is not aware of at σ. Let T = {p, A j p | p, j ∈ v (ψ)}. For any τ, τ where τ ↔ Ai(σ) τ ∈ σR i there is a subset of T true at τ . We may apply the axioms AK3 and AK4 to derive
Therefore there is some maximal consistent set ρ containing χ(τ ), and as τ agrees with ρ on the interpretation of all atoms up to the depth of ψ, we must have (M, τ ) |= ψ as required. As this is the case for every τ ∈ S it must be that L i (τ
For the inductive step we proceed in a similar fashion. Suppose τ ↔ Ai (σ)τ ∈ σR i . Given that we may apply the axiom AK4 to replicate the awareness state of agents at τ . We may then apply the inductive hypothesis to infer K j ψ k at (M, τ), where ψ k has knowledge depth less than n. Finally we may again apply AK3 and AK4 to replicate the interpretation of atoms, and other agents' awareness of the atoms at τ . As ψ may be written as a Boolean combination of atoms, agents' awareness of atoms and formulas K j ψ k (where the knowledge depth of ψ k is less than n), the result follows. A 
